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ABSTRACT 
This research focuses on Italy, Brazil and the Republic of Korea, how each 
purchased the US Marine Corps' Advanced Amphibious Vehicle (AA V), and how each 
supports the AA V through the life-cycle requirements. The thesis provides insights 
through an in-depth analysis of each country's political, economic and defense aspects. 
A predictive model determines the support requirements on future FMS sales by studying 
the past. Thus, the Marine Corps can estimate the future requests for spare parts in 
support of the AAA V. 
The research identifies political stability, economies of scale, and trust between 
the foreign government and the seller as the major factors needed to predict decisions 
about procurement of spare parts through FMS. 
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The purpose of this research is to analyze the historical data from three 
countries-Italy, Brazil and South Korea-and develop a predictive model to determine 
future support requirements. Although all three countries purchased the Amphibious 
Assault Vehicle (AA V) via Foreign Military Sales (FMS), they used different methods of 
purchase and support to attain their life-cycle requirements. This research will analyze 
the three different approaches and other salient e~onomic, political, and defense aspects. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AA V) was originally manufactured in the early 
1970's to enhance the United States Marine Corps' amphibious capabilities. Over the 
years it has gone through numerous upgrades. Many allies have realized the capability 
that the AA V brings to their military, and have acquired it through Foreign Military Sales 
(FMS). A new amphibious vehicle, the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAA V), 
is roughly 1 0 years away from being fielded. The Marine Corps is already looking for 
allies to participate in the cost sharing in the production of the AAA V. It is important to 
understand the needs of the countries that are asked to become involved. Due to the 
expected cost of $5.0 million per vehicle, the Marine Corps needs these countries to help 
lower its unit cost through economies of scale. In an era of lower defense budgets, this 
can be accomplished when an FMS customer purchase increases volume production, 
which in turn lowers unit costs for US customers. 
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The Marine Corps is not only concerned about the production costs of the AAA V, 
but also the life-cycle costs. Once the AAA V is fielded, the lifetime maintenance costs 
of the vehicle will increase as the production line closes after the last AAA V is produced. 
The same economies of scale that would bring the cost of the AAA V down will bring the 
cost of the spares down as well. Yet, a problem results when the foreign customer seeks 
spares from other sources, in which case the Marine Corps does not benefit from 
economies of scale. The question is, can the Marine Corps predict the future sources of 
spares that the foreign customer will request? The answer is yes. By studying historical 
data of previous FMS sales of a similar vehicle, the Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AA V), 
the Marine Corps can predict what sources will be utilized to purchase spares in support 
of the life-cycle requirements of the AAA V. 
This research will focus on Italy, Brazil and the Republic of Korea, how each 
purchased the AA V, and how each supports the AA V through the life-cycle 
requirements. An in-depth analysis will be made of each country's political, economic 
and defense factors. In the end, a better predictive model will be developed to determine 
the support requirements on future FMS sales. Thus, the Marine Corps might better 
estimate the future requests for spares in support ofthe AAA V. 
Italy purchased 25 Landing Vehicles Tracked Personnel (LVTP 7) variants (an 
early version of the AA V) in the early 1970's under the Military Assistance Program 
(MAP). No support was delivered under the MAP. It is believed that Italy supports its 
vehicles indigenously. Italy is currently interested in upgrading its amphibious vehicles 
as well as procuring additional new vehicles. United Defense (UDLP) plans to sell nine 
AA Vs with the Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, Rebuild to Standard (RAM/RS) 
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upgrade on a direct commercial basis. The proposal includes the outfitting of USMC 
AA V hulls with all new components. UDLP also plans to share the work with Italy 
through a kit installation program. 
The Brazil Marine Corps (BRMC) procured 14 AA V variants and associated 
support from the USMC under an FMS program. The vehicles and associated support 
were delivered in May 1997. These vehicles complemented the initial 12 AA Vs 
delivered in 1985 under FMS. Brazil has supported their AA V s through various FMS 
cases, to include spares, repair parts, publications, Engineering Change Proposals (ECP) 
notifications and schoolhouse training. They are currently asking for pricing data 
through FMS to upgrade all 26 vehicles to resolve configuration problems. 
The Republic of South Korea (ROK) Marine Corps procured a total of 42 AA V 
variants from the USMC in 1985. South Korea has the second largest AA V fleet. The 
South Koreans have utilized the FMS follow-on support cases to support all of their 
variants for the last several years. Most vehicle repairs and maintenance are conducted 
by the ROK Marine Corps, with some support coming from their industrial base. 
Currently, through a direct arrangement between UDLP and Samsung, the Koreans are 
co-producing 57 AA V variants. 
With this variety in approaches to life cycle support, an in-depth study can 
determine the various factors involved in decision-making in support of the AA V, 
providing insight into how allies decide on system support. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis addresses a primary research question as well as several secondary 
questions. The primary research question is: What is the primary factor in determining 
the future method of purchasing spares in FMS sales? 
The secondary research questions are: 
• Why is the U.S. Government involved in weapon system sales to foreign 
nations? 
• What is the FMS history of amphibious vehicles and what future FMS 
activities are anticipated for the AAA V? 
• What part do politics, economics and defense play in FMS and spare parts 
purchase requirements? 
• What are the advantages and disadvantages to the U.S. Marine Corps of a 
predictive model for determining the future methods of purchasing spare 
parts in FMS? 
• What conclusions and recommendations result from this study? 
D. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will analyze the procurement policies of three countries, Italy, Brazil 
and South Korea, to model the needs for life-cycle requirements in future FMS cases. 
The foreign sales process starting with the FMS program, the Direct Commercial Sales 
(DCS) program, and offsets will accomplish this. The history of the AA V will be 
explained including a description of the recent upgrades contained in the Reliability, 
Availability, Maintainability, Rebuild to Standard (RAMIRS) program, all ofwhich will 
carry the AA V until its successor, the AAA V is fielded. This thesis will include an in-
depth analysis of the political, economic and defense factors of Italy, Brazil and South 
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Korea to determine the rationale for their decisions on life-cycle support. The desired 
result will be a predictive model to explain the purchase of spares in FMS cases. 
The methodology used in this research consists of the following steps: 
• Conduct a literature search of books, magazine articles, CD-ROM 
systems, Government reports; Internet-based materials and other library 
information resources. 
• Conduct interviews via phone and e-mail with personnel at Marine Corps 
Systems Command that are involved in the FMS program. 
• Conduct interviews with UDLP, the producers of the AA V. 
• Look for trends or key elements that will allow the FMS cases to be 
categorized and analyzed. 
• Develop a model concerning economic, political and defense factors in 
determining the future requirements for spares support. 
, E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter II provides background on the FMS program and Direct Commercial 
Sales (DCS) program. It also explains offsets and how they affect US companies. The 
chapter concludes with an explanation of why the US is involved in FMS/DCS. 
Chapter III describes the AA V' s FMS history and future with an historical 
analysis of the AA V. The chapter concludes with an explanation of the Business 
Enterprise Partnership (BPA) and who it benefits. 
Chapter IV presents the unique political, economic and defense factors that 
influence FMS in each analyzed country: Italy, Brazil and South Korea. 
Chapter V is an analysis of the factors and influences presented. The chapter 
develops a model of predictive support requirements in FMS sales. 
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Chapter VI concludes the thesis with direct answers to the primary and secondary 
research questions. Areas of future research are identified. 
F. BENEFIT OF STUDY 
This thesis is intended to primarily benefit the FMS office at Marine Corps 
Systems Command and other FMS activities throughout the Department of Defense. The 
historical review and analysis will assist future weapon systems FMS sales in 
determining the request for spares so the Program Manager's office can better formulate 
economies of scale. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES 
There is a tradition of cooperation between the United States (US) and other 
sovereign nations who have similar values and interests to strive to meet common 
defense goals; this is called Security Cooperation. It consists of a group of programs 
authorized by the US Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act 
and related statutes by which the US Department of Defense (DoD) and a commercial 
contractor provide defense articles and services in furtherance of national policies and 
objectives. [Ref. 1] 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and International Military Education and Training 
(IMET) are two key programs included within Security Cooperation. IMET is conducted 
solely on a grant basis. FMS can be conducted using cash or FMS Financing. [Ref. 1] 
This part of the thesis will focus on FMS. 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) is defined as a portion of the US security assistance 
authorized by the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976. It is conducted on the basis 
of formal contracts or agreements between the United States Government (USG) and an 
authorized recipient government or international organization. FMS includes 
government-to-government sales of defense articles or defense services, from DoD stocks 
or through purchase under DoD managed contracts, regardless of the source of financing. 
[Ref. 2] 
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FMS is usually a non-appropriated program through which eligible foreign 
governments purchase defense articles, services and training from the USG. Some FMS 
programs may be funded through the Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP) that 
uses appropriated funds. The purchasing government pays all costs (either with cash 
deposits or FMFP credits) that may be associated with a sale. In essence, there is a 
signed government-to-government agreement, normally documented by a Letter of Offer 
and Acceptance (LOA) between the USG and the foreign government. [Ref. 2] 
FMS is operated and managed by DoD on a non-profit and no-loss basis. DoD 
usually charges a fee of 3% (currently the Marine Corps charges 2.5%) to the receiving 
nation based on the overall cost of purchase to pay for administering the program. [Ref. 
3] 
Defense articles, including major defense systems, subsystems, support 
equipment, repair parts and publications are provided under FMS. Services include 
training in US military schools or through Mobile Training Teams (MTTs). Contract 
administration, program management, technical support and repairs are also provided 
under FMS. Due to interest in encouraging standardization and interoperability between 
US and security cooperation nations, FMS normally involves the transfer of those items 
that previously have been used by the US forces. [Ref. I] Two good examples of this are 
Norway and the Republic of Korea, both buying F-16 Fighters, thirty and twenty 
respectfully [Ref. 4]. 
FMS does not just happen. Many US Government agencies are involved to 
ensure the US Public's interest is always being served. The US Congress establishes the 
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laws, authorizes programs, appropriates funds and has an oversight role in security 
cooperation. The principal legislated responsibilities fall to the Department of State 
(DoS) and DoD. The Secretary of State provides continuous supervision and general 
direction for FMS, including the determination of whether there will be a program for a 
country and, if so, its scope and whether, and when, a particular sale will be made. [Ref. 
1] 
The Secretary of Defense implements programs to transfer defense articles and 
services. Each recipient country has a US diplomatic mission for in-country management 
of the FMS program. The Security Assistance Officer (SAO) provides oversight for the 
FMS program within the assigned country in conjunction with country counterparts, and 
the regional Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of the Unified Command; Office of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (JCS); Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), formerly known as 
Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA); and the US Military Department 
(MilDep ). DSCA is the agency that performs administrative management and program 
planning. [Ref. 1] Basically there are many agencies involved in ensuring that the 
recipient country receives the defense articles and services and that the US Government's 
interest is served with respect to US National Defense and US industry protection. 
Foreign military sales have a variety of complexities. A foreign government as 
well as the USG is always cautious about buying and selling military equipment. Many 
incentives have to be offered if one government is to buy military equipment and services 
from another government. 
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In dealing with a foreign country, it is important to realize that the sovereign 
foreign government is concerned with its independence and how it looks to its people and 
to the rest of the world. This should never be underestimated. No country wants to be 
viewed as a puppet of the United States. Though technologically superior in every way, a 
US contractor must be able to sell its equipment under the assumption that it is the best 
available (i.e. technologically superior, and reliable; a basic best value consideration) 
while not tied too closely to the US. At the same time, the US contractor needs to 
emphasize that it is US-made and therefore promotes a sense of US-foreign sovereign 
cooperation. 
B. DIRECT COMMERCIAL SALES 
The AECA allows the purchasing government or organization the choice of FMS 
or Direct Commercial Sales (DCS). There are benefits and risks to using DCS. A 
country purchasing a mature technology or having experienced acquisition professionals 
may choose DCS. DCS is a government or organization dealing directly with the US 
company vice going through the USG as in FMS. [Ref. 2] 
Direct Commercial Sales are licensed under the Arms Export Control Act. DCS 
are an element of security assistance for Congressional oversight purposes. A direct 
commercial sale licensed under the AECA is a sale made by US industry directly to a 
foreign buyer. Unlike the procedures employed for FMS, direct commercial sales 
transactions are not administered by DoD and do not involve a government-to-
government agreement. Rather, the US Governmental "control" procedure is 
accomplished through licensing by the Office of Defense Trade Control (ODTC) in the 
Department of State. The ODTC reviews all requests for licenses and other applications 
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to export defense articles, services or technical data; establishes licensing policies and 
procedures; and enforces compliance with the International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
(ITAR). [Ref. 2] 
Eligible governments may request contract administration and contract audit 
functions normally provided by DoD contract administration offices and the Defense 
Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) auditors, with DCS purchases. The procedure is for the 
foreign customer to submit a request for such services to the Defense Contract 
Management Agency International, New York, which has been designated as the DoD 
Central Control Point and is responsible for arranging DCS contract administration and 
contract audit services. [Ref. 2] 
C. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES TO FMS 
1. Advantages to the Customer 
The advantages of FMS are that it provides government-to-government 
connections, offers 'control of classified material or munitions, allows the US to share 
information, allows for cooperative agreements, and improves interoperability with other 
countries. The main advantages of FMS, though, are that the US guarantees the work of 
the contract and the follow-on support. The US Government is involved in the 
acquisition of items or services and acts as a buffer between the foreign customer and US 
industry. The US Government ensures that the needs of the customer are met, despite 
cultural or communication differences, and also ensures that the item or training 
purchases are interoperable with the US military. [Ref. 5] 
Another advantage is when a foreign country requests items using FMS, the US 
Government will furnish the items from its stock and resources, if available, or will 
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procure under terms and conditions consistent with the Department of Defense (DoD) 
regulations and procedures. When procuring for the foreign country, DoD will usually 
employ the same quality and audit procedures as would be used in procuring for the US, 
unless requested otherwise by the foreign customer. [Ref. 6] 
2. Disadvantages to the Customer 
Disadvantages to FMS are time and cost. Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) 
provide speed in purchasing. The FMS offices review each case, or purchase, which 
must be approved by many different departments during a process that may last up to six 
months. The bureaucratic red tape slows the process down [Ref. 5]. In DCS, all the 
customer really needs to do is identify a need and negotiate a price and a delivery time. 
The price is usually higher using FMS. Even though the foreign customer is afforded the 
same benefits and same protection as DoD procurement agencies, this does not mean that 
FMS prices are identical to prices for DoD domestic contracts. The contract prices for 
the same item are different between domestic purchases and FMS purchases [Ref. 6]. 
The key factor in the price differential is the application of "costs" which are 
allowable under FMS contracting, but may not be allowable under a domestic contract. 
The allowable costs are recognized as reasonable and allocable costs of doing business 
with a foreign government, although such costs might not be recognized when pricing 
domestic defense contracts [Ref. 6]. The reason for this is additional services, resulting in 
costs, which are being performed benefiting the foreign government. An example is 
translation of publications into another language [Ref. 6]. Also, when items are 
purchased through the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), DLA puts a surcharge on the 
item to cover its overhead cost of purchasing, storing and maintaining the item [Ref. 8]. 
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Some of the indirect costs may avoided if the foreign customer purchases directly from 
the source, using DCS. 
When selling a mature technology where costs are relatively well known and risk 
is generally neutral, there may be an advantage to the foreign customer to purchase using 
DCS. This is especially true if the company and the foreign customer have a 
procurement history. The writer is informed by Marine Corps Systems Command 
(MCSC) that sometimes foreign customers will request price and availability data (P&A), 
which is a rough order of magnitude data. Foreign customers want to get a rough idea of 
how much it will cost, for a possible FMS order. The foreign country then directly 
contacts a commercial company for a DCS purchase, basically comparative shopping. 
The Marine Corps quickly drops out of communication with foreign countries in such a 
case to prevent comparison shopping [Ref. 7]. It is DCS, FMS or a hybrid of the two; the 
country is discouraged from playing one against the other. 
There can be a hybrid of DCS and FMS, providing the customer the advantages of 
both options. An example is the Marine Corps development of an anti-tank weapon, the 
Predator. The United Kingdom (UK) is interested in a similar weapon and is looking to 
the US and another country as the possible supplier. Through FMS, the UK obtains 
testing information with the Marine Corps. If the UK chooses Predator, it will enter into 
joint development with the US for cost sharing. Part of the system will be provided to the 
UK through FMS, and part through DCS. [Ref. 5] 
The US DoD is neutral on whether a government chooses FMS or DCS. In either 
case, the US industrial base benefits, expanding their markets beyond the monopsony, or 
single customer, that most defense firms have. This can only improve the financial well 
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being of the US industrial base and at the same time extend the warm production base, 
benefiting both contractor and DoD. 
D. OFFSETS 
The Defense Acquisition Deskbook (DAD) defines offsets as an agreement of one 
of various industrial and commercial compensation practices required of defense 
contractors by foreign governments as a condition for the purchase of defense 
articles/services in either government-to-government or direct commercial sales. The 
responsibility for negotiating the offset arrangements resides with the US firm involved. 
The USG does not discourage offsets. The US recognizes that this is the price for 
conducting business overseas. 
A major concern that a foreign country may have with purchasing a major system 
from the US is the inherent need to maintain employment and .quality of life in its own 
country. Purchasing from the US means money is leaving the foreign country even 
though there is a benefit for their national defense. This may be very politically risky. 
Many nations have an offset program written into their contracts where a foreign 
contractor agrees to purchase local commodities and services or render technical 
assistance to encourage industrial growth. It is an agreement that, "I'll scratch your back, 
if you'll scratch mine." [Ref. 3:p. 27] 
Offset activities may be grouped into the following: 
• Coproduction and subcontracting. Coproduction is defined as a program 
implemented by a government-to-government or commercial licensing 
arrangement which enables a foreign government or firm to acquire the 
"know-how" to manufacture or assemble, repair, maintain and operate, in 
whole or in part, a defense item. Subcontracting is a contract or 
contractual action entered into by a prime contractor or subcontractor for 
14 
the purpose of obtaining supplies, materials, equipment, or services under 
a prime contract. [Ref. 9] 
Coproduction or subcontracting within the foreign country might be required by 
the contract. A US company wishing to do business with a foreign country may find it 
necessary to enter into such an arrangement. 
• Technology transfers. Technology transfers could occur when a 
technologically advanced US item is provided to a foreign country for 
production. 
• In-country procurements. In-country procurements are when some of the 
US system is subcontracted out to local vendors or parts are procured from 
local vendors. Contracts will sometimes specify the percentage of a 
system that must be locally produced. 
• Financial assistance and marketing assistance. Financial assistance is 
when a US contractor assists the purchasing country's business sector with 
loans, investments or joint ventures. Marketing assistance occurs when 
the US contractor provides a guarantee of future business with the country 
involved. 
Offset Activities may fall into more than one category. [Ref. lO:pp. 4-10] For the 
purpose of this thesis, the majority of offsets are in two main categories: direct or 
indirect. Direct offset is tightly linked to the military procurement itself; it involves the 
transfer of military technology, usually by granting license to the receiving country to 
manufacture a US weapon system, its components or sub-components. A few examples 
of direct offset: 
• A US prime contractor transfers military technology to the offset country 
with the purchase of a sophisticated fighter aircraft 
• A US prime contractor subcontracts with in-country suppliers 
• A foreign subcontractor manufactures part of a US-made weapon system 
in the offset country 
Indirect offset is not directly military-related; indirect offset involves the foreign 
country exporting an unrelated product through the US prime contractor into the selling 
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country or transferring unrelated commercial technology. A few examples of indirect 
offsets: 
• The prime contractor exports grapes from the offset country to another 
country 
• The prime contractor transfers commercial technology to the offset 
country 
• The prime contractor runs advertisements in the US to help promote 
tourism in the offset country 
All the offsets clearly benefit the offset country by broadening the offset country's 
opportunity for commerce. [Ref. 3:pp. 228-29 and Ref. IO:pp. 4-6] 
Offsets contractually require the US prime contractor to expand the opportunity 
for commerce by the offset country. However, upon closer examination, the US 
contractor also benefits. The contractor establishes business relations with the offset 
country increasing corporate profits and positioning the company for further business 
opportunity. 
Notwithstanding, the possibility of additional business, US defense firms would 
prefer generally not to be involved in offsets and just sell outright the system or service 
for a fixed price. Yet, companies are willing to enter into offset arrangements because 
it's the cost of doing business. One Sikorsky spokesman put it simply by stating, "Sixty 
percent of something is better than 100% of nothing." [Ref. 3] 
From the perspective of the buyer, offsets are very attractive. The country gets a 
modern weapon system or service and access to a new technology, and/or improved 
employment opportunities. One possible drawback is that the per unit cost of a weapon 
system with offsets would be higher than without them. [Ref. 3] The company shifts the 
offset costs to the customer. 
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E. CHAPTER ·SUMMARY 
This chapter has described some of the complexities ofF oreign Military Sales. A 
contractor has many perceptions and issues to deal with before entering into FMS or DCS 
with the US or US firms. This is a very political arena. Every nation must be concerned 
with defense, and wants technically advanced weapons. Also, every nation is sovereign 
and wants to at least appear to be able to defend itself without help from another. The 
USG and US contractors must balance technology, economies of scale and the US 
military's history and presence to aid in selling overseas with respect and sensitivity 
toward our international neighbors. 
The clearest incentive for the United States to sell its equipment to foreign 
governments via FMS or DCS to is to maintain the industrial base and improve 
economies of scale for its purchases. Many US defense manufacturers need more foreign 
business to ensure profitability and survivability. Foreign sales lowers cost of 
production. increases returns on research and development, and offset declining business 
[Ref. 11 :p. 78). The defense manufacturers continue to stay in business and the 
production lines continue to function. If the production line would become idle, then the 
company would have to lay off workers or manufacture something else. Either way, the 
in-house kno\\ ledge and skill of providing defense articles could be lost. The designing 
and manufacturing engineers would move to competing enterprises, or even work for 
foreign arms producers. In a time of war, where the strength of the industrial base and its 
ability to surge and mass-produce equipment for war could mean defeat and even the 
sovereignty of the nation could be at stake. 
17 
The more an item is produced the lower the cost because of economics of scale. 
For every eight F-18 aircraft sold overseas, the US gets one free [Ref. 12]. As the 
production line produces more of an item, the overhead costs are spread over a greater 
range. In the era of lower defense budgets, more frequent operations and obligations, the 
lower the cost the more the US DoD can buy for its money. Maintaining the domestic 
industrial base, improving profits for US corporations and lowering the costs of 
procurements are all clear incentives to sell US articles and services overseas. 
The company is motivated by more than the current sale for doing business in a 
certain country. A contractor can establish a relationship with the foreign government, 
basically gaining a foothold into a new market. For example, Lockheed Marti could sell 
missiles to China. If the missile worked well and was reliable, China could consider 
Lockheed Martin a trustworthy corporation. Lockheed Martin then approaches the 
Chinese Government and asks if they could sell a consumer item to its population. China 
agrees and Lockheed Martin now has revenue from the missile sales and also access to 
China's population of 1.32 billion people for consumer items. A contractor by just 
gaining the confidence of a foreign nation could exponentially increase its revenue. 
Technology exchange is good and bad. It is important to remember that a friend 
today may be a foe tomorrow. If cutting-edge technology gets into the hands of our 
enemy, many Americans may perish. One of America's greatest advantages is 
technology and staying on the forefront of technology. These technology exchanges help 
foster better relations with our allies and improve interoperability. As the US ensures 
that our allies are equipped with the most up-to-date weapon systems in the world, it is 
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less likely that they will need US assistance in a short conflict. Also, it will ensure US 
allies stay US allies because of the associated benefits. 
Trade benefits the nations involved, whether it is military equipment or grapes. 
Selling US military equipment and services overseas opens many opportunities to 
establish national relationships and commercial partnerships. Trade builds relationships 
and relationships build trust. 
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III. AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT VEHICLE 
A. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
1. History of the AA V7 Al 
In March 1964, the United States Marine Corps issued a requirement for a new 
LVT (Landing Vehicle, Tracked) to replace the LVT5 (used in the 1950's and 1960's, 
model 5) and, after evaluating a number of proposals, a contract for the development of a 
new L VT was awarded to the then Ordinance Division of the FMC Corporation. In 
J(!.rmary 1994, FMC's Defense Systems Group (which included the Ground Systems 
Division) and BMY's Combat Systems Division formed a new joint venture company 
called United Defense Limited Partnership (UDLP, or United Defense). United Defense 
became a private company in 1997 when the Carlyle Group purchased the defense 
interest of the FMC Corporation and the Harsco Corporation. [Ref. 13] 
The first production vehicles, which were designated the L VTP7 (Landing 
Vehicle, Tracked, Personnel, Model 7) were handed over to the United States Marine 
Corps in August 1971 and the first unit equipped (FUE) occurred in March 1972. Final 
deliveries were made in September 1974 after which the LVTP5 and its variants (1950's 
vintage) were phased out of service. In 1985, the US Marine Corps changed the 
designation of the L VTP7 AI (AI on the end of the model number means some changes 
and upgrades have been made to the original design) to the Amphibious Assault Vehicle 
Personnel Model 7 Version AI (AA VP7 AI) without changing the configuration. All 
new production vehicles were built to the AA V7Al configuration and all existing US 
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Marine vehicles that were not A 1 versions were upgraded to the new production standard. 
[Ref. 13] 
The AA V7 A 1 is expected to be replaced beginning in 2006 when the Advanced 
Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAA V) is slated to reach Initial Operational Capability 
(IOC). Final Operational Capability (FOC) for the AAA V is planned for in 2013. To 
enable the current AA V7 A 1 to remain in operation through the year 2013, the Marine 
Corps has established the RAMIRS (Reliability, Availability and Maintainability/ 
Rebuild to Standard) program, covered in detail later in this chapter. [Ref. 14] 
The AA V7 A I and several versions of the L VT have been sold to many countries. 
In 1972, the Italian Marine Corps purchased 25 L VT7s via the MAP (Military Assistance 
Program). Italy is currently working out a co-production agreement with United Defense 
that will include 9 RAMIRS AAV7A1s and an up-grade ofthe LVTs to the AAV7A1 
standard. In April 1995, through the Marine Corps Systems Command, United Defense 
received a firm-fixed price contract for a total of 14 AAV7A1 Assault Amphibious 
Vehicles for the Brazilian Marines under the Foreign Military Sales Program. In late 
1995, United Defense and Samsung Aerospace of South Korea signed a major direct 
sales contract with the Republic of Korea to co-produce a total of 57 AA V7 AI vehicles 
in three versions between 1996 and the year 2001. In September I997, United Defense 
entered into a $40 million direct sales contract with Spain to rebuild AA V7 vehicles for 
the Spanish Marines that had been originally purchased between 1972 and 1974. The 
vehicles were upgraded to the AA V7 AI standard. United Defense subcontracted with a 
Spanish contractor to do the work in Spain. The contract with United Defense and Spain 
also covers technology transfers, tools and spare parts. [Ref. I3] 
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The following figure describes the countries that had purchased, prior to 2000, 
amphibious vehicles from the United States and which variants were purchased. They 
are listed by variant and vehicle. There are three different variants P, C, and R. The 
Personnel variant, AA V7PA1, is a troop carrier and can carry 17-21 combat equipped 
troops. The Command variant, AA VC7Al, carries extensive communications capability. 
The Recovery variant, AA VR 7 A 1, enables vehicle recovery and maintenance functions; 
it has a complete maintenance shop capability. 
LVT7 AAV7A1 
Personnel Command Recovery otal Personnel Command Recovery Total 
USA 0 0 0 0 1,151 106 64 1,321 
Argentina 19 I I 21 0 0 0 0 
Brazil 0 0 0 0 22) 2 2 26 
Italy (A) 24 I 0 25 0 0 0 0 
9* 9* 
Republic 53 5 3 61 41 1 0 42 
of Korea 54** 2** I** 57** 
(B) 67** 67** 
166 
Spain (C) 16 2 1 19 
Thailand 12 0 0 12 18 2 1 21 
Venezuela 9 I I 11 0 0 0 0 
Total 117 8 5 130 1,248 113 68 1,429 
(A) Italian LVT7s are being upgraded to AA V7AI RAM/RS configuration along w/ the 9 AA V7AI RAM/RS's 
being co-produced by United Defense & Italy.(*) Italian production has not started, thus annotated separately. 
(B)(**) Korea's totals include the 42 previously purchased, plus the 57 AA V7Ais currently being co-produced 
w/ United Defense, and the additional 67 AA V7 A 1 s planned to be co-produced by United Defense & 
SAMSUNG. The U.S. Marine Corps sold the technical data package (TDP) to Korea for co-producing these 
AA V7A1s, which total 124 (57+ 67 = 124). 
(C) Spain's 19 LVT7s were upgraded to AA V7A1 via a DCS arrangement between United Defense & Spain. 
This effort was completed in 1999. 
ADDITIONAL NOTES: 
• All L VT transactions were via the Military Assistance Program (MAP), i.e., grant aid at no cost to the 
buying country. 
• All AA V7 A 1 transactions were via the FMS process, except for those noted above as co-production 
arrangements (i.e., Korea & Italy, and Spain's upgrade, which are all DCS). 
Figure 1. Amphibious Vehicles By Country. After Refs [13 and 15] 
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2. RAM/RS Program 
The RAM/RS program is the latest and probably the final upgrade to the 
AAV7Al. 
Many systems on the AA V7 AI are reaching the end of their useful life and will 
require replacement. Marine Corps Systems Command determined that instead of 
Inspect and Repair Only as Necessary (I ROAN), the next cycle of AA V7 A 1 depot 
maintenance action would more appropriately be a Rebuild to Standard. [Ref. 14] 
RAMIRS (Reliability, Availability, Maintainability/ Rebuild to Standard) 
program grew out of the IROAN program. In the mid 1990s, after many years of IROAN 
maintenance fleet planners saw the need for a formal system upgrade. There was a need 
to maintain the AA V7 A 1 fleet to bridge the time gap before the new AAA V would be 
fielded. RAMIRS grew out of that need. [Ref. 14] 
The Marine Corps Commandant approved the RAM/RS program in June 1997. 
The program focuses on reducing total ownership costs by using greater than 90% 
commonality of parts with the Army's fleet of more than 5,000 Bradley vehicles. This 
enhances the Marine Corps logistic capability, permits higher volume procurements of 
sub-systems, provides "economies" of parts procurement, and revitalizes a vendor base 
for supporting the platform. The rebuild to standard portion was specifically tailored to 
address fleet problems. Several upgrades had added weight, which caused the AA V7 A 1 
to become slower in the water and on land. The upgrades had used parts that were unique 
to the AA V7 A 1. The RAMIRS program addresses these concerns by adding improved 
suspension and power train and improving the overall maintainability of the vehicle. The 
RAM/RS program includes 680 of the 1321 AA V7Al vehicles in the USMC inventory. 
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The RAM/RS commenced in 1999 and is scheduled to modify 170 vehicles per year. 
[Ref. 16] 
3. The Need for the AAA V 
It important to understand the US need for the AAA V because this is the Marine 
Corps' amphibious vehicle of the future. This section will explain why a US allied 
country might be interested in the AAA V and the doctrine change it supports. 
The Marine Corps is developing a modem amphibious vehicle that will support a 
change in doctrine. The new doctrine is called Operational Maneuver From the Sea 
(OMFTS). U.S. Allies are an integral part of the doctrine and it is highly unlikely that the 
U.S. will be involved in a military conflict without allied participation. Their ability to 
participate alongside U.S. Forces in the future means that allies need also to develop 
similar doctrine. The U.S. will have difficulty operating jointly with allied nations ifthey 
adhere to different tactics and doctrine. 
OMFTS is a Naval concept developed by the Marine Corps in concert with the 
Navy. In OMFTS, Naval forces focus on an operational objective using the sea as 
maneuver space to generate overwhelming tempo and momentum against critical enemy 
vulnerabilities. OMFTS requires overcoming challenges in battlespace mobility, 
intelligence, command, control, and sustainment. [Ref. 16] 
In the 1980's, the Navy and Marine Corps developed a concept of over the 
horizon (OTH) assaults to avoid enemy strengths, exploit enemy weaknesses, and protect 
Navy ships from increased land based missile threats and sea based mine threats. This 
concept has matured into the OMFTS concept. The AAA V, together with the MV-22 
Osprey tiltrotor aircraft and the Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC), will provide the 
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tactical mobility required to spearhead OMFTS. [Ref. 16] The Marine Corps believes 
that these three warfighting systems are critical to the OMFTS concept. 
The AAA V will allow immediate, high-speed surface maneuver of Marine 
infantry units as they emerge from ships located over the visual horizon 25 miles and 
beyond. Operations will be conducted in a manner that protects the Marine and Naval 
forces, exploits the intervening sea and land terrain to achieve surprise and rapidly 
penetrate weak points in the enemy's littoral defenses to seize operational objectives 
[Ref. n16]. The current versions of the AA V7Al do not have this ability. Further 
improvements (e.g. RAMIRS) to the AA V7 A 1 cannot attain the desired end state of 
capability. In simple terms, the AA V7 Al cannot meet the requirements to fulfill the new 
doctrine. 
In August 1999, the AAA V program began prototype contractor shakeout testing, 
with developmental testing and early operational testing conducted concurrently. Under 
the current schedule, full rate production will begin and Initial Operational Capability 
(IOC) will be achieved in Fiscal Year 2006. The USMC plans to buy a total of 1013 
AAAV's. Full Operational Capability is scheduled for Fiscal Year 2013 [Ref. 16]. By 
2013, our allies must decide whether they will purchase the AAA V and participate with 
the United States in the OMFTS concept. Beyond that time the production line will go 
cold and the cost of restarting a cold line may be too much to bear. 
B. BUSINESS PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (BP A) 
1. Background on the BP A 
The BP A is important to the reader because it offers a hybrid option between 
FMS and DCS. The benefits associated with FMS are incurred with a DCS sale. 
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The Business Partnership Agreement (BP A) is a proposal that would join the 
USMC and United Defense in a common venture. The purpose of the partnership is to 
upgrade the AA V7 A 1 to the RAMIRS standard and to 'sell' to allied countries the 
AA V7A1s that are above the Marine Corps requirement. On 28 October 1999, United 
Defense provided a written proposal to the Marine Corps to provide exchange allowance 
for nine AA V7Al hulls from stock in support of their efforts to sell the AA V7Al to Italy. 
The new approach was to include the USMC, United Defense, subcontractors such as 
Cummings, and the Defense Logistic Agency (DLA) in a partnership. No one in the 
partnership would be the majority owner. [Ref. 17] 
The BP A envisions converting Marine Corps AA V7 A1 s to AA V7 AI RAMIRS in 
support of foreign sales. [Re£ 1 7] 
The Marine Corps has a total of 1,321 Assault Amphibian Vehicles (AA V7Al) in 
its inventory, but an Approved Authorization Objective (AAO) of 1,057. That means that 
the Marine Corps has 264 AA V7A1s over AAO that could potentially be offered up for 
foreign sales. Currently, there is only funding for 680 AAV7A1s to undergo the 
RAMIRS upgrade, 3 77 would not be RAM/RS [Ref. 17]. With limited funding, the 
Marine Corps will upgrade only the AA V7A1s in the Assault Amphibian Battalions 
unless more funding becomes available. [Ref. 18] 
2. Benefit to the Marine Corps 
Benefits are important for the reader to understand for this is the Marine Corps' 
motivation for getting involved in the BP A. Without this incentive there will be no 
agreement. 
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There is only funding for 680 AA V7 A 1 s to undergo the RAM/RS upgrade, and 
the remaining 3 77 are not funded for RAM/RS upgrades. The Marine Corps intends to 
sell the remaining 264 AA V7A1s under FMS and/or credit the unsold FMS AA V7A1s to 
United Defense. 
The Marine Corps Requirements Oversight Committee (MROC), chaired by the 
Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, stated that the proceeds from any AA V7 A 1 
sales under FMS Replacement With Improved (RWI) procedures would go to the AAA V. 
[Ref. 15] 
An Amphibious Vehicles International Business Strategy (A VIBS) study was 
conducted by MARCORSYSCOM in 1999. Several important recommendations of that 
study were: (1) that the AAAV be sold via FMS only, (2) that AAV7A1 (RAMIRS) 
would be available only via the USMC (inferring FMS), and (3) that FMS Replacement 
With Improved (RWI) procedures be followed in an attempt to get the proceeds of any 
AA V7A1 or RAM/RS sales returned to the USMC. The AVIBS study was briefed to the 
MROC in the first half of Fiscal Year 00. [Ref. 15] 
In 1999, United Defense was selected and became the sole source provider of 
RAMIRS upgrades on the AA V7 A 1 [Ref. 7]. The Marine Corps is deciding to move a 
step further with not just United Defense, but other companies that have been selected as 
sole source providers (e.g. Cummings, producer of the AA V engine). The Business 
Partnership Agreement (BPA) has evolved into choosing a company through competitive 
selection, making it the sole source provider for all future sales, and working with that 
company for all upgrades, future production and technology innovation. BP A would then 
be a joint venture where the Marine Corps and associated companies have a shared vision 
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of the future with respect to production and sales. A final definition of the BP A will 
come forth once the Marine Corps has officially approved the BP A. 
3. Benefit to United Defense 
United Defense is already benefiting from its agreement with the Marine Corps. 
The RAM/RS program is to exceed $40 million [Ref. 19]. As part of the partnership 
United Defense is the sole source provider for all future FMS sales of the AA V7 A1 and 
all upgrades [Ref. 20] to customers such as Spain and Brazil where sales are likely [Ref. 
21]. United Defense will obtain increased business and profits addressing all USMC 
AA V7A1 inventory, and a long-term relationship with the Government. 
United Defense gains an advantage by easing possible apprehensions of potential 
customers who, in the past, have only dealt with the US Government. The customer gets 
benefits of DCS and the comfort of the USMC standing beside the product. Once the 
AAA V is fielded, the AA V7 Als will be phased out and United Defense will be given the 
opportunity to se II AA V7 A 1 s to international customers in greater numbers without the 
need to open a production line. 
lJ nited Defense benefits: 
• Complete access to the AA V7Als 
• Access to the Government supply system and components with equal 
priority 
• Work directly with all associated technical manuals 
• USMC will back the company when and where needed 
• The Marine Corps will share all information concerning Engineering 
Change Proposals (ECPs) and problems incurred with the vehicle [Ref. 
22] 
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4. Technical Data Rights 
It is important for the reader to understand who owns the technical data rights. 
The US Government can sell the rights to a country or business for use. A country or 
business cannot use, sell or produce with intent to sell to another country the technical 
data rights without the consent of the holder of the rights. 
The ownership of technical data rights is as follows: 
• Pre-1984 -FMC owned all technical data rights 
• 1984- 1987- United Defense owns the technical data rights 
• 1987 - 1994 -Many different companies contributed to the ECPs and 
USMC reserved the rights to all technical data 
• 1994 - present The Marine Corps owns the technical data rights. This is 
basically the RAM/RS program [Ref. 18] 
The Marine Corps owns the rights to theAA V7 A 1 RAM/RS and AA V7 A 1 
program and the use of those rights must come through the USMC. United Defense 
needs the RAM/RS program in order to modernize and upgrade the AA V7 A 1 s currently 
in use overseas. The use and ownership of the technical data package is one of the major 
areas of negotiations that have delayed the signing of the BP A. Generally, it is agreed 
that United Defense can build the vehicle configuration up to 1987. (i.e., AA V7) [Ref. 
15] 
C. FUTURE AAA V SALES 
Concerning the future, the reader must understand that the US Marine Corps is 
moving forward with the AAA V and the OMFTS concept. As described earlier in this 
chapter, some of the US allies are likely to change their doctrine to be consistent with 
OMFTS. Those allies are the focus for the predictive model. 
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The AAA V will be available via FMS only, and full rate production is not 
expected until 2006. The Marine Corps has been marketing the AAA V for over a year 
now. The USMC would prefer to have FMS customers participate in production as early 
as possible in full rate production. This would reduce the unit cost and learning curve 
costs. In fact, a recent study revealed that if 50 units were sold via FMS in the first year, 
for every five AAA V s sold, the USMC would get one AAA V free. The price tag, at 
roughly $5 million a copy, does make a lot of customers nervous. However, there are a 
few interested countries that can afford them. Taiwan has received enough AAA V 
briefings and information that they have a general idea as to what the AAA V will cost 
them. Japan and Korea have also shown some interest [Ref. 15]. The major problem that 
is being faced is the cost. It will be very difficult for a country to commit to a large 
procurement roughly several years in advance. As of yet, no countries have made any 
concrete requests for the AAA V. 
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IV. FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE DEFENSE SALES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
According to the New York Times, International arms sales surged to $30.3 billion 
(US) in 1999, as the United States solidified its position as the world's biggest arms 
dealer. American contractors sold nearly $11.8 billion in weapon sales in 1999, which 
was more than a third of the world's total and more than all European countries combined 
[Ref. 23]. According to the London Daily Telegraph, the United States increased its 
market share to 49.1 percent of the arms suppliers in 1999. Britain followed with 18.7 
percent, and France, with 12.4 percent. Russia, benefiting from a devalued ruble, was in 
fourth place, with 6.6 per cent [Ref. 24]. The exact percentage of US market share might 
be in question, but the underlining theme that the US dominates weapon sales remains 
unchallenged, although there may be growing competition among arms suppliers in the 
years ahead. Many countries are eager to protect their own defense industries, yet are 
unlikely to turn to the international market. However, the United States has an advantage 
over other international sellers, since previous American sales often result in repeat 
customers. "There are very few big sales out there, but for the last 25 years, the US has 
developed relationships with so many countries that now, even though it's a very difficult 
market, we have a competitive advantage in selling spare parts and support services," 
said Dr Richard F. Grimmett, an analyst for the Congressional Research Service who 
wrote a report on the subject that was delivered to Congress in the summer of2000. [Ref. 
23] 
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In a related article, it was announced that the US will maintain its role as a major 
defense supplier to Greece as that country continues efforts to update its forces [Ref. 25]. 
Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen said in an October 2000 joint press 
conference with the Greek Minister of Defense Akis Tsohatzopoulos in Thessalonike, 
Greece. 
Greece is in the process of modernizing its forces, as all NATO allies are 
striving to improve their defense capabilities. I must say that I am very 
pleased that Greece is continuing to look to the United States as a major 
supplier of its modernization needs. [Ref. 25] 
Cohen explained that in a 1999 summit in Washington, NATO members decided 
they had to address weapon system deficiencies that had been identified during the 
conflict in Kosovo. NATO members are in the process of identifying their requirements 
to meet those deficiencies. [Ref. 25] 
The United States "remains a very strong competitor, indeed a supplier, of 
these modern needs for Greece and other countries," Cohen said. "We 
compete, and we believe that we have the best products at the best 
price ... But I think that our relationship focuses upon the need for 
interoperability, which is key for effective action on the part ofNATO and 
EU (European Union) members." [Ref. 25] 
Interoperability is major benefit of FMS. Being able to communicate and work 
together using similar equipment and reducing duplication of maintenance support is a 
major benefit of interoperability. 
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B. ITALY 
1. FMS of Amphibious Vehicles and Support 
The Government of Italy currently has 25 Landing Vehicles Tracked (LVT7s), 
consisting of 24 L VTP7 Personnel carriers and one L VTC7 Command vehicle. These 
L VT7s were delivered to Italy in the early 1970s under the Military Assistance Program 
(MAP). No support was delivered under this program. The MAP program usually does 
not come with support since the program requires no funding from the receiving country. 
[Ref. 18] Currently, Italy is a cash-paying customer without US Government assistance 
in military procurement. [Ref. 26] If Italy wanted to attain support for the LVTP7, it 
would have to arrange a separate support package. As far as this writer's research has 
determined, no support was requested or delivered by either United Defense or the United 
States. [Refs. 22 and 26] 
The Government of Italy is interested in upgrading their amphibious vehicles, as 
well as procuring additional new vehicles. United Defense plans to sell Italy nine 
AA V7A1 (RAM/RS) vehicles on a direct commercial basis, which would bring their total 
to 34 vehicles. The proposal includes the outfitting of USMC AA V hulls with all new 
components. United Defense also plans to share the work with Italy through a kit 
installation program. [Ref. 18] As of this writing, production has not started. Share of 
work is like an offset in this context. Instead of agreeing to buy a specific percentage of 
the contract's value, a percentage of the work is subcontracted out to an Italian company. 
This is done to ensure passage through Italian Parliament, or to secure partial and/or 
complete funding via the Italian Ministry ofindustrial Affair's budget. [Ref. 26] 
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It is believed that Italy has been repairing and maintaining their vehicles 
indigenously [Ref. 18]. Italian law contains protectionist requirements for buying foreign 
products, similar to the US "Buy American Act," which requires the US Government to 
consider US companies before foreign companies are considered. The fact that Italy did 
not seek logistic support for the LVT7s stems from a number of reasons listed below: 
[Ref. 26] 
• Indigenous capability 
• A source of much needed jobs 
• Paucity of funds for outside logistics 
• A means to secure Parliamentary support 
The latest United Defense efforts with Italy may result in an increased ability to 
support the vehicles within their own country. Italy's plan to replenish spare parts for the 
new vehicles is not known at this time. It is anticipated that they will develop a long-
term relationship with United Defense for direct commercial support. If United Defense 
delivers a configuration consistent with that of the USMC, it will also be possible for 
Italy to utilize FMS for follow-on support. [Ref. 18] More likely, Italy will continue 
using Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) for the resupply of spares. DCS can come in many 
forms in Italy: third party sales, licensed sales in-country, and a licensed indigenous 
company producing parts within Italy for sale commercially to their government. [Ref. 
26] 
FMS is not the preferred method of procurement in Italy. The Italians do not 
want to tie up money in the FMS program unless it is necessary. Three examples of 
potential FMS use are as follows, (1) a sensitive, technically complex item; (2) in order to 
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get an item that is in production sooner rather than later (taking advantage of another 
country's volume production); or (3) in the case of national security [Ref. 27]. Italians 
would like a co-production type arrangement where they could not completely produce 
an item on their own. Italy prefers to produce within their country and will pay the 
higher price just to ensure that the product is produced in-country by their citizens. There 
is no record of a technical data transfer for the AA V for Italy to produce spare parts 
within their country. It was stated earlier that Italians prefer indigenous production; it 
then should be clarified that it is possible that Italy is producing the spare parts 
indigenously or procuring the parts from another source, other than United Defense. 
[Ref. 18] 
According to Commander Michael R. Pease, USN Office of Defense Cooperation 
United States Embassy, Rome: 
DCS is much more responsive than FMS, and the incentives are much 
better aligned to support the end user. It is not the 2.5% FMS admin fee 
that countries object to, it is that dealing with FMS adds a huge layer of 
red tape, delays and risks. There is little incentive for US services to 
spend the time, effort and money to support a lot of diverse, small order 
quantity accounts on behalf of other countries-where's the benefit to 
USN or USMC? FMS has limited utility. [Ref. 26] 
Commander Pease's position is that there is no incentive for the US to become 
more efficient in regards to small value orders of FMS sales. The lack of efficiency in 
FMS provides incentives for the customer to choose DCS over FMS. 
In a related matter, FMS is still being utilized. The Italian government has 
requested a purchase of 50 SM-2 Block IliA Standard missiles, via FMS, with weapon 
system components, including spare and repair parts, support, training, US Government 
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and contractor technical assistance and other related elements of logistics support. The 
estimated cost is $135 million (US). This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign 
policy and national security objectives of the United States by improving the military 
capabilities of Italy and further weapon system standardization and interoperability with 
US forces. [Ref. 28] Generally, FMS works fairly well in the areas of training, and those 
items where that can "piggy back" onto a large production run by a US service customer. 
[Ref. 26] As noted earlier, FMS may be utilized in the purchase of technically complex 
items or when the Italian government deems it critical to national security. 
The Italian Navy has shown a very strong interest in buying the AAA Vas well as 
LCAC but currently does not have the funding [Ref. 29]. This is mentioned to remind the 
reader that AAA V will only be sold via FMS and to suggest that Italy is considering 
following the US Marine Corps concept of Operational Maneuver From The Sea 
(OMFTS), which requires the AAA V, LCAC and the MV-22 [Ref. 16]. 
Typically, Italy imposes a 50 percent offset on US contractors marketing weapon 
systems in Italy; however, the researcher could not confirm the presence of an offset 
agreement between Italy and the missile manufacturer [Ref. 28]. If Italy can get 100% 
offset, they will clearly try. Often Italy is successful in getting a higher offset percentage. 
The US C-130J sale to Italy was about 100% offset. As a policy, the US Government no 
longer discusses offsets; such deals are strictly between a private firm and the customer. 
[Ref. 26] 
2. Italian Political Economic and Defense Status 
Italy has a 1999 population of roughly 58 million and the unemployment rate 
remains at about 13 percent of the working-age population. A large national debt has 
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plagued Italy's economy. The national budget of Italy is in deficit spending at about 
2.8% of GDP (1997), which is approximately $26 billion (US). In keeping with 
provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, which created the European Union, Italy is 
attempting to reduce its budget deficit and has been moderately successful. [Ref. 26] 
Italy has a parliamentary form of government. It has been a democratic republic since 
June 2, 1946, when the monarchy was abolished by popular referendum. The Italian 
Republic is now in its 57th government since 1945, the third in the current legislation 
period, which is currently in its fourth year. [Ref. 30] 
According to Peter Weber an Italian political writer: 
To bring down an Italian government seems in fact one of the most 
effortless moves in the world: indeed, a simple no-confidence vote in one 
of the chambers is enough and the prime minister is forced to step down. 
But usually it is not even necessary to go that far, the simple threat of such 
a move by only one of the many coalition partners can open a government 
crisis. [Ref. 30] 
The researcher concluded that the elected officials are very sensitive to public 
opinion. Order is maintained through a well-established bureaucracy that supports the 
elected offices. [Ref. 31] Even though there have been many short-lived "governments," 
three during the last three years, there are no major modifications in the defense 
procurement policy during this period of change. [Ref. 26] 
In 1998, the gross national product (GNP) was estimated at $1.17 trillion (US), or 
about $20,350 per capita and industry contributed 31 percent to the value of this domestic 
output. An ongoing problem of the Italian economy has been the slow growth of 
industrialization in the south. [Ref. 31] 
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In 1998, the Italian permanent armed forces totaled 265,500 people, with an army 
of 165,600, a navy of 38,000, an air force of 61,900, and a central staff. Compulsory 
military service for men extends for one year. [Ref. 30] Italy is in the near future 
eliminating the draft. It is moving toward a smaller, professional, armed forces. [Ref. 26] 
The Italian Navy includes the San Marco Group, which is their version of the U.S. 
Marine Corps. It is built around a regimental size unit, similar to the US Army brigade. 
Each unit contains roughly 5000 people, one organic helicopter squadron and three LSTs. 
They are probably the most heavily employed unit in the Italian military. San Marco is 
totally volunteer. Currently, they are designated along with the Spanish Marines as part 
of the standing EURMARFOR amphibious unit. This unit is known as SIAF, Spanish 
Italian Amphibious Force. [Ref. 29] 
There is also the Lagunari Regiment of the Italian Army, which specializes in 
amphibious and riverine operations. It uses USMC doctrine and has had limited training 
with the USMC. They use the AA V, LCM-6 boats as well as Zodiacs. They are about 
2000 strong of which 85% are volunteer. This is important because most of the Italian 
military is conscript and, by law, conscripts are not allowed to deploy outside Italy. [Ref. 
29] 
Italy is a part of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European 
Union (EU). Italy has no real threats to its sovereignty, as long as it remains a NATO 
member. [Pease] It borders on the Adriatic Sea near the Balkans area, which has become 
very unstable since the end ofthe Cold War in 1989. On May 19-20, 2000, Italy hosted 
the "Conference on Development and Security in the Adriatic and Ionian." The 
conference focused on the catalyst constituted by the countries in the region bordering a 
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common sea. The intention was overcoming the present problems and tensions that have 
multiplied in the area over the last few years as a consequence of the recurring and 
dramatic Balkan crises. The conference emphasized the opportunities offered by 
concerted action with a view to the future stability and development of the area. The 
emphasis was to promote stability in the area. The aim was enhancing regional 
cooperation as an effective instrument for fostering overall stability in the area, which 
coincides with an integrated and sub-regional approach that the European Union itself has 
recently adopted. [Ref. 32] 
The bulk of the Italian maritime forces are arrayed along the Adriatic coast to try 
to stem the flood of Balkan immigration into Italy, and subsequently onto the rest of'the 
EU. Italy's incentive for keeping the immigrants out of their country is internal stability. 
Italy has limited social outreach programs that could not withstand a large influx of 
welfare recipients. [Ref. 26] 
B. BRAZIL 
1. FMS of Amphibious Vehicles and Support 
The Brazilian Marine Corps (BRMC) procured 14 Assault Amphibious Vehicles 
(12 AA VP7Al Personnel, one AA VC7Al Command and Control, and one AA VR7Al 
Recovery) and associated support from the USMC under an FMS program. The vehicles 
and associated support were delivered on 12 May 1997. These vehicles complemented 
the initial 12 AA V7 A1s delivered in the 1985 timeframe under FMS. These older model 
AA V7 A 1 s included 10 AA VP7 AI Personnel carriers, one AA VC7 A1 Command vehicle, 
and one AA VR7A1 Recovery vehicle. [Ref. 18] The total inventory of amphibious 
vehicles is 26. 
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When asked why Brazil has AA V s, Lieutenant Commander Peter Rabang, the 
Security Assistance Officer for Brazil, answered, " ... because they have adapted various 
aspects of US amphibious doctrine." [Ref. 33] This is important because as the Marine 
Corps changes its doctrine, Brazil may follow suit. 
After Brazil's purchase, the Marine Corps initiated the Reliability, Availability, 
Maintainability /Rebuild to Standard Program (RAM/RS) and Brazil was interested in 
upgrading to the RAMIRS standard their AA Vs purchased in the '80's and 90's. A Rough 
Order of Magnitude cost estimate in the amount of $42 million (US) was forwarded to 
Brazil, providing pricing data on the upgrade of all 26 Brazilian vehicles to the USMC 
RAMIRS configuration under FMS. This would have resolved their current problem of 
supporting two different configurations, as well as obsolescence problems with some of 
the components from the 1985 variants [Ref. 18], but the cost was too high at that time. 
In fact, the total cost was as much as the original AA V itself. Also, Brazil wanted to 
keep the support needs the same [Ref. 33]. RAM R/S would require different support 
than they were used to with the AA V variants that Brazil had acquired. Then Brazil 
looked at just purchasing the RAM/RS suspension system, which would require a 
complete dismantling of the vehicle. This was to be done by the US, but was also too 
expensive for the Brazilians. Brazil then considered upgrading the vehicle within their 
own country, indigenously, so MARCORSYSCOM traveled to Brazil for a site visit with 
the Brazilians. It was determined that the cost of set up and tooling would not justify the 
expense, due to the limited number of AA V s that would require the upgrades. The 26 
vehicles would not provide economies of scale for such an action. The technical data 
rights for installing the suspension, themselves, was never really addressed. [Ref. 33] 
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The Brazilians produce in-country only when there are economies of scale. High 
use items are considered for manufacturing. Low use items are bought offshore. [Ref. 
22] 
When Brazil bought the AA V7A1 via FMS in 1997, it included a FMS support 
package [Ref. 33]. Initial support provided in the 1997 FMS procurement (14 vehicles) 
included an interim spares package (for two years), support and test equipment (one site), 
training, and publications. Brazil also procured additional spares to support all 26 
vehicles [Ref. 18]. The Marine Corps has a formula that calculates parts usage for the 
kind of equipment operation anticipated by the country involved [Ref. 21]. United 
Defense offered support packages via direct commercial sales (DCS) and to by-pass 
FMS. Brazil declined the offer. The advantages of the DCS from United Defense were 
that parts would be received faster. The disadvantages were that in the case of 
Government furnished equipment, United Defense would be required to go through the 
US Government to get the parts. Brazil is buying some parts for the engine via DCS 
because the parts are readily available via commercial sources in-country. They are 
buying these parts directly from the local manufacturer's representative. [Ref. 33] 
Follow-on support is being provided to Brazil through various Foreign Military 
Sales cF\tS) cases. to include spares, repair parts, publications, ECP notifications, repair 
of repairahles. and schoolhouse training in CONUS. The BRMC conducts most vehicle 
maintenance and repairs within their military but depot level maintenance is limited. For 
repair or fabrication of items of an industrial nature, the BRMC has used Brazilian 
industry. This also holds true for numerous parts required for sustaining ships acquired 
from the US. Brazil also obtains a limited amount of material and services support on a 
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direct commercial basis, usually from US companies or through a Brazilian 
representative who is affiliated with a US company [Ref. 18]. There are United Defense 
and Cummings (the AAV engine manufacturer) representatives in Brazil. There is also a 
Cummings plant in Brazil, where many of their engine parts are readily available. [Ref. 
7] 
Brazil supports the older version of the AA V via FMS support from the US. 
Brazil would like to upgrade the gun system on the older versions of the AA V to the 
newer up-gunned weapon system on their newer vehicles, but it is too expensive. [Ref. 
33] 
According to Lieutenant Commander Peter Rabang, the Security Assistance 
Officer for Brazil: 
The Brazilians expect the AA V to last a long time. They would like to 
acquire technology and make things in-house where practical. This way 
they can gain the experience, technology and know-how for the future. 
When they acquire a piece of gear they want to know how to repair it 
themselves. [Ref. 33] 
BRMC had problems with the warranty that they had for the 1997 procured 
AA V s. There was a misunderstanding as to who would pay for problems that developed 
after delivery. The USMC became involved and determined that in some cases Brazil 
was responsible and in others United Defense was responsible. The Marine Corps 
solution was to send a joint USMC and United Defense Technical Assistance Team to 
Brazil with some mechanics and operators to show the Brazilians how to fix the problems 
themselves. USMC also went in as arbitrators. After arbitration, United Defense did fix 
some non-warranty items. Yet there were some problems that United Defense would not 
fix which Brazil could not fix themselves, so the Marines performed the maintenance 
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[Ref. 18]. Because the Marine Corps helped out when the Brazilians really needed it, 
Brazil really feels that they could depend on the US Marine Corps [Ref. 7]. Brazil 
thought that they had gotten burned by United Defense [Ref. 18]. This was an FMS sale. 
The problems that Brazil incurred were not entirely the fault of United Defense. 
Brazil had not purchased a support package that would provide training and publications 
on how to maintain and operate the vehicles. Brazil had already been operating the 
AA V7 for several years. The Marine Corps was adamant about Brazil needing the 
training with the purchase of the 14 vehicles, which would be included in the FMS case. 
However, Brazil refused [Ref. 18]. 
FMS sales to Brazil contributed to the foreign policy and national security of the 
United States by helping to improve the security of a friendly ally that has been and 
continues to be an important force for political stability and economic progress in South 
America. [Ref. 34] 
2. Brazilian Political, Economic and Defense Status 
Brazil has a population of roughly 17 4 million people. The unemployment rate in 
Brazil is around 7% but many of those considered employed are actually part-time 
workers. Brazil ended military rule in 1985 and currently has a democracy. In the recent 
past it has had extremely high inflation rates, which reached a peak of more than 1,500 
percent a year in 1991. A corruption scandal also badly damaged the government. In 
1992, legislative investigations uncovered an influence peddling scheme that involved 
hundreds of millions of dollars and implicated the President; he was later impeached. 
Under a new President, inflation dropped from a rate of 45 to 50 percent per month in 
early 1994, to a rate of about 1 to 2 percent per month over the next two years, giving 
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Brazilians their lowest inflation rates in decades. In 1995, legislation on federal 
expenditures dramatically reduced government involvement in the economy. The 
government privatized major state enterprises, broke up the government-controlled 
telecommunications monopoly, and eliminated restrictions limiting the amount of money 
foreign corporations could invest in Brazil. [Ref. 35] 
Brazil's GNP was $768 billion (US) in 1998; per capita was $4,700. [Ref. 36] 
The manufacturing sector has been a key to Brazil's economic development. A major 
objective of Brazil's industrialization policy was to replace imported manufactured goods 
with Brazilian-made goods. As a result, industry has become highly diversified, 
including a range of high technology and heavy industries. Industrialization has involved 
a mixed pattern of investment by domestic capital; by the government in areas such as 
steel, petrochemicals, and aircraft; and by foreign capital . in the manufacture of 
automobiles, chemicals, and electrical goods. As a result, Brazil is one of the world's 
major steel producers and car manufacturers. [Ref. 35] 
The army is the largest military force, and almost 60 percent of its members are 
drafted. Men between the ages of 18 and 45 must serve a compulsory tour of duty 
ranging from 12 to 18 months. The navy and the air force have lower proportions of 
draftees. There is also a paramilitary public security force and a large military reserve. 
The army has a total of 337,800 active-duty with 133,500 are conscripts; the navy has a 
total of 58,400 active with 2,000 conscripts; 15,000 of the Naval personnel are Marines; 
the air force has a total of 59,400 on active-duty with 5,000 conscripts. The military 
ruled the government prior to 1985, maintaining good relations with neighboring 
countries, and little internal political violence. Since then, the role of the armed forces 
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has been diminishing. A new ministry of defense was created in 1999, the army, navy 
and air force is under one civilian Minister, ending a long tradition of three separate 
military ministers in control of the armed forces. Secretary of Defense William Cohen 
noted, "Brazil now has for the first time a Minister of Defense. On past trips I had to visit 
with each of the heads of the military." Now Secretary Cohen meets with just one 
minister making planning and execution of joint training easier. [Ref. 37] Brazilian 
defense currently absorbs 3.1 percent of the government's expenditure, falling from 4 
percent under the military regime. [Ref. 35] This is about 1.7 percent ofthe Brazil's GNP 
[Ref. 33]. 
According to Lieutenant Commander Peter Rabang, the Security Assistance 
Officer for Brazil: 
The Ministry of Defense for Brazil is trying to work out supply logistics 
similar to the United States' DLA, but is not there yet and the services are 
not yet consolidated. Currently all services procure their own parts. There 
initially was a lot of resistance to the consolidation, but government 
remains stable. 
Brazil has no serious threats to their territories. They are just concerned, 
like every other country, about protecting their sovereignty. [Ref. 33] 
Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, 
Manaus, Brazil, Tuesday, October 17, 2000: 
I hope we can bring a continued spirit of cooperation to the challenges 
now facing our friend, Colombia, where the drug trade, insurgency, and 
paramilitary forces threaten one of South America's oldest democracies 
and stable economies. The US is concerned that the "spillover" of those 
problems to neighboring states, which has been increasing in recent years, 
will only worsen if we do nothing. Working together, we hope to help 
Colombia in their time of need and prevent the conflict from shifting 
Colombia's problems to its neighbors. [Ref. 37] 
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Brazil is one of Colombia's neighbors. Economic growth and increasing security 
concerns with drug trafficking in the northeast are likely to spur rising procurement. A 
concerted effort is underway to upgrade armed forces in critical areas. The military is 
beginning to enhance mobility, attain reasonably high-technology forces and maintain 
parity in terms of strike forces with those of other regional powers. Within the limits of 
the present economic situation, Brazil is determined to upgrade its armed forces to a level 
consistent with the country's regional and global importance. [Ref. 19] 
Brazil is a member of the Organization of American States (OAS). OAS 
facilitates cooperation between member countries on matters of security and economic 
and social development. Membership includes all 35 nations in the western hemisphere 
excluding only Cuba. 
C. REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK) 
1. FMS of Amphibious Vehicles and Support 
Currently the United States Marine Corps International Programs Office has 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases with the Republic of Korea (ROK) Marine Corps in 
support of their Assault Amphibious Vehicles (AA V). These cases provide for the 
procurement of AA V7A1 spare parts. In addition, the ROK Marine Corps procured 
Landing Vehicle Tracked (L VT) excess spare parts through the USMC to support an 
aged fleet of 61 LVTs (53 LVTP7 Personnel carriers, five LVTC7 Command vehicles, 
and three LVTR7 Recovery vehicles). The ROK Marine Corps procured a total of 42 
AA V7A1s (41 AA VP7A1 Personnel carriers and one AA VC7A1 Command vehicle) 
from the USMC in 1985. Of note, the Korean Marine Corps has the second largest AA V 
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fleet in the world. [Ref. 18] ROK amphibious vehicles will total 227 once all production 
is complete. 
The Koreans have not made modifications to their older amphibious vehicles. 
They are just maintaining them. It is ROK's practice to almost exclusively buy parts 
through FMS cases. [Ref. 38] Through FMS, the Koreans are confident that their 
requirements will be met. [Ref. 27] 
Roughly 15 percent of spares are produced indigenously, not through DCS or 
FMS. The hydraulic steering unit is an example of why they do not indigenously produce 
many spare parts. The unit cost is thousands of dollars and it is a part that seldom needs 
to be replaced. With tooling and plant costs, it is not cost effective to produce internally. 
The economies of scale are not present with items that do not have a high demand. The 
ROK will manufacture spare parts as long as there are economies of scale. With the 
exception of minor parts, there is currently nothing of significance produced 
indigenously. [Ref. 38] 
In the case ofFMS, which includes follow-on logistics, the United States is by far 
the number one supplier. However, there are numerous foreign countries likewise 
aggressively vying for this market. It is foreseeable the United States could lose some 
market share to these other countries. [Ref. 38] 
Lieutenant Colonel J.C. Smith USMC, is the Marine Corps Liaison to the ROK 
Marine Corps in FMS and Chief LiaisoJ;t for the US Defense Procurement Agency 
Liaison Office. When asked about predicting the future for spare parts procurement by 
ROK, he commented: 
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Although the ROK's brought their first 42 AAV7A1 vehicles through the 
FMS system, they have subsequently co-produced "new" AA V7 A 1 
vehicles in-country through a joint effort with Samsung and United 
Defense. I believe the ROK Marine Corps will continue to support their 
entire fleet, to include the new vehicles, utilizing the FMS system. They 
are comfortable with the system and fully realize the USMC will support 
their efforts. [Ref. 3 8] 
The Koreans have utilized FMS follow-on support cases for all of their variants 
over the last several years. Most vehicle repairs and maintenance have been conducted 
by the Korean Marine Corps, with some support coming from their industrial base. [Ref. 
18] 
Under a direct commercial arrangement with United Defense and Samsung, the 
Koreans are co-producing a quantity of 57 AA V7A1s. This, in effect, will expand the 
indigenous industrial capability to provide spares and repair parts, to conduct upgrades, 
repairs. and maintenance. It is possible that Korea may be purchasing support directly 
from United Defense (outside of the above arrangement); however, it is more likely that 
Korean industry is fabricating parts to support the vehicles. [Ref. 18] 
On the :!"d of August 2000, United Defense signed a $117 million follow-on 
contract with Samsung Aerospace in South Korea for production of Korean Amphibious 
Assault \'chicles (K.AA V). The KAAV is closely modeled on the United Defense's 
AAV7Al amphibious vehicle. This is a follow-on contract from the 57 AAVs that are 
currently being produced. United Defense and Samsung Aerospace will jointly 
manufacture the vehicles. The hulls will be built in York, P A. Samsung will start 
production in 2001. [Ref. 19] 
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"This is an important new order for United Defense and it continues the strong 
partnership that we have with Samsung," said Art Roberts, Vice President and General 
Manager of United Defense's International Division. [Ref. 19] 
ROK purchased the technical data package for the AA V7 AI for the co-production 
from the US. During the co-production, the ROK must inform the US of all 
improvements (ECPs) to the AA V. ROK is supposed to contribute 50 percent to the 
production of the AA V, their 50 percent being designated parts and assemblies. The 
Marine Corps Systems Command had received repeated requests via FMS from ROK for 
AA V parts for 57 amphibious vehicles. [Ref. 18] ROK may not be manufacturing their 
own designated parts; they appear to be purchasing them from the US via FMS. 
ROK is paying more for the AA V, nearly one million dollars more than the cost 
of an AA V via FMS, because of the added co-production costs. ROK asked the US about 
the possibility of a co-production or co-development involving the AAA V. The Marine 
Corps considered it too risky because the possibility of slips in schedule in such a highly 
visible program, which is likely when there is more than one developer. The Marine 
Corps wants to solely manage the development of the AAA V. The cost of roughly $5 
million a copy 10 years in advance also prevented ROK from committing to the program. 
[Ref. 18] 
2. ROK Political Economic and Defense Status 
The Republic of Korea was proclaimed on August 15, 1948 following the post-
World War II partitioning of the peninsula between the occupying forces of the United 
States in the south and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the north. 
South Korea rose from devastation in the 1950s, the result of war with North Korea, to 
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become one of the world's largest economies in the 1990s. The population of South 
Korea is roughly 47 million. The country's population density of 477 persons per sq km 
(1,235 per sq mi) is one of the highest in the world. Manufacturing is dominated by 
'chaebol', which is a large conglomerate of companies with greatly diversified interests. 
[Ref. 35] Chaebols are monopolistic by nature and in the past, corruption has often been 
associated with the very word [Ref. 38]. 
An economic crisis developed in December 1997, when investors lost confidence 
in the debt-laden Korean economy and the ROK currency rapidly depreciated. The 
plummeting currency quickly depleted the Korean's foreign currency reserves, 
threatening the capacity of the government, banks, and industries to repay foreign debt. 
Furthermore, the unemployment rate soared as unstable businesses declared bankruptcy. 
The government accepted one of the largest aid packages ever arranged with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The agreement, however, required South Korea to 
implement tough austerity measures, such as reductions in public spending, and tax and 
interest rate hikes. [Ref. 35] 
The economy is currently doing quite well since IMF pumped in money. ROK 
President Kim, Dae-jung was required to institute many changes and make several 
guarantees before IMF was willing to come to the assistance of Korea. The ensuing 
changes, and the subsequent stimulation of the economy, will require the chaebols to 
change their business practices. [Ref. 38] 
The true unemployment rate is hard to gage. However, the official rate is in the 
vicinity of 6 percent [Ref. 38]. In 1998 the GNP was $399 billion (US); per capita it is 
$8,600 (US) [Ref. 36]. 
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In 1998, total active military forces stood at 672,000. Membership was as 
follows: army, 560,000; navy, 62,000 of which 22,500 are Marines; and.air force, 52,000. 
Reserve forces total 4.5 million. There still are approximately 36,000 US troops 
stationed in the ROK. [Ref. 35] 
The ROK Marine Corps is somewhat dominated by the ROK Navy. The 
Commandant of the Marine Corps is a three star general; the Chief ofNaval Operations is 
a four star. The ROK Navy has oversight over certain facets of the Marine Corps. For 
example, overseas training quotas are centrally managed within the ROK Navy 
Headquarters and requisitions for FMS cases are submitted through the ROK Navy 
Logistics Command. [Ref. 38] 
Until the early 1970s, the ROK's military procurements came almost exclusively 
from the US. From that time, however, the country began to develop its own indigenous 
defense industry. The reasons behind this initial drive for local arms procurement were 
threefold. First, local arms procurement would provide greater self-sufficiency in order 
to ensure a reliable source of supply and to provide an adequate defense capability. 
Second, the ROK perceived that producing its own arms would improve the state's 
regional political-military position. Third, it was thought that internal weapons 
development would promote advanced technological industrialization and perform an 
import-substitution function, thus giving an impetus to economic growth and prosperity. 
By 1992, the ROK was officially producing 63 per cent of its total defense procurement 
locally; by 1995, this figure had risen to 79 per cent. Generous foreign technological 
assistance at relatively low cost has been largely responsible for the ROK's expansion in 
arms manufacture. The US has been at the forefront, since 1971, in supplying the ROK 
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with advanced military technologies, designs, component parts and sophisticated weapon 
systems. Reliance on licensed-product systems, precision parts, designs and military 
technology, from overseas is high. [Ref. 19] 
A ROK Marine General commented to Mr. Bruce Sellers, the AAA V 
International Programs Manager, during a briefing on the capabilities of the AAA V and 
the concept of OMFTS (Operational Maneuver From The Sea), which the US Marine 
Corps has embraced, that OMFTS is a major change from the current doctrine. To follow 
the OMFTS concept the ROK would be required to acquire new weapon systems for the 
delivery of personnel and equipment and basically change the fundamental doctrine that 
the ROK is currently using. It was recently announced that the ROK has inquired about 
the purchase of the Landing Craft Air Cushioned (LCAC) from the US. [Ref. 15] 
The Republic of Korea has significant threats to their security. North Korea 
maintains a large Army, threatening both the ROK and US forces stationed on the 
peninsula. The ROK and North Korea are still in a declared state of war and have never 
signed a peace treaty. China allied with North Korea during the Korean War and is still 
considered a threat. [Ref. 38] Japan is still considered a threat, despite the results of 
World War II. ROK still remembers when Japan took the peninsula militarily and 
occupied it until the end of that war. They believe this could happen again. With real 
threats to their security, the ROK maintains a high state of military readiness. 
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V. ANALYSIS 
This chapter will focus on an analysis of the predictability of FMS support for the 
AAA V. The preceding chapters focused on (1) FMS and DCS, (2) AA V and AAA V and 
(3) three AA V customers. This background is important in order to predict the future. 
Winston Churchill often repeated, "Those who do not know history are destined to repeat 
it," therefore learning from the activities of the past will help to not repeat the mistakes of 
the past. 
Figure 2 was developed by the researcher in order to have a comparison of the 
three countries evaluated in Chapter IV. The evaluation factors in Figure 2 were 
compiled as a way to understand the actions of the government in each individual country 
and in a general way to predict future actions. This approach requires judgment calls by 
the researcher who is considering all the information gathered in the previous chapters. 
There are 1 9 factors that are evaluated. Each factor was chosen as contributing. to the 
decisions by each individual government as to how support will be procured for the 
AA V. These factors should also determine how any particular country will chose support 
in the future. It is the intent of the researcher that these factors be utilized by a selling 
organization in determining future procurement decisions for individual countries. These 
factors arc a .. snap-shot' or present day evaluation and can change with changes in the 
economies of each nation 
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COUNTRY 
Evaluation Factors ITALY ROK BRAZIL 
1. Population 58 million 47 million 174 million 
2. Unemployment 13% 5.50% 7% 
3. Per Capita GNP ($US) 20,350 8,600 4,700 
4. Industrial Capability /Moderate Moderate Moderate 
5. Stability of Government Low Moderate Moderate 
6. Stability of Democracy High High /Moderate 
7. Size of Military 265,500 674,000 455,600 
8. Size of'Marine Corps' I 7,000 22,000 15,000 
9. Marine Corps as a% ofTotal 2.60% 3.30% 3.30% 
Military 
~ 10. Draft (Conscription) Yes Yes Yes i 11. Follow USMC Doctrine Yes Yes Yes 
12. Steps toward OMFTS Yes Yes No 
13. #Amphibious. Vehicles 34* 227** 26 
14. # RAMIRS AAVs 9*** 0 0 
15. Date Last AA V buy Concurrent Concurrent 1997 
16. Threat Level Low High Low 
17. Trust in US Nil High High 
18. Need for US assistance !Low High Moderate 
19. Current Spares Support Indigenous FMS FMS 
*Includes the 9 AA Vs under contract between Italy and Umted Defense 
**57 currently being co-produced and the 67 that are to be produced in ROK 
***Vehicles currently on contract to be delivered to Italy in the very near future 
Figure 2. Country Evaluations. 
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• Population indicates the number of people who reside in the country. 
This factor was determined to be important as it relates to capacity or 
potential. 
• Unemployment indicates, out of the population, how many people by 
percentage are without jobs. 13 percent in Italy is an indicator of high 
employment, which can easily cause turmoil within the Italian 
government. Brazil's unemployment rate of seven percent is considered 
moderate to low. An increase in unemployment can cause worker 
dissatisfaction and, similar to Italy, turmoil in the government. ROK's 
unemployment rate of five and one half percent is considered moderate to 
low and currently does not seem like a major factor. In most 
industrialized nations, an unemployment rate of from five to seven percent 
is considered acceptable without any negative effects on the economy. 
• Per capita GNP is a factor that indicates the relative buying power per 
person. Comparing all three, Italian population has substantially more 
money per person. Brazil and the ROK are virtually the same. This factor 
indicates individual citizen wealth and his/her strake in maintaining the 
status quo or making changes to the status quo. 
• Industrial Capability is a factor that evaluates the capability within the 
country to manufacture parts or major end items economically, without 
building new infrastructure. All three countries evaluated have similar 
industrial capabilities and are more than capable· of producing the spare 
parts for their amphibious vehicles, whether or not it is economically 
sound to do so or not. 
• Stability of Government is a factor that evaluates the ability of the 
elected officials to make decisions that may be unpopular and then to 
remain in office thereafter with the confidence of the people. Italy was 
evaluated as having low stability because of their many changes in 
governments. Any change, such as unemployment increasing, or the 
lowering of per capita income, can cause another Italian government to 
topple. Both ROK and Brazil are evaluated as moderate because of a 
change of government is possible but may require more than just an 
increase in unemployment. A high stability of government would be a 
country that makes decisions on the basis of economics rather than 
politics. 
• Stability of Democracy is a factor that evaluates the ability of a country 
to withstand turmoil and unrest without a major risk of a coup. Italy and 
ROK are considered highly stable. Therefore they exhibit a small 
likelihood that their democracy may end if the politicians made decisions 
that arouse anger in the people and create the possibility for a non-elected 
person to gain control. Brazil has a history of military rule and was 
considered moderate because of its history. 
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• Size of the military is a factor that helps to determine the national will 
related to defense. 
• Size of the Marine Corps is a factor that indicates the potential quantities 
of future AAA V s. That is, a small marine force would never be a large 
purchaser of equipment and would be an unlikely candidate to 
manufacture their own repair parts. 
• Marine Corps as a percent of the total military is a factor to explain the 
percentage of the military spending that the Marine Corps, or in Italy's 
case the amphibious forces, in comparison to the overall force structure. 
Relative size of the marine force suggests potential funding limits for 
equipment modernization and subsequent support costs. 
• Conscription is a factor that indicates professionalism within the services. 
Having the conscripts in their ranks identifies potential problems with high 
maintenance through constant retraining. This factor indicates a basic 
level of competency. The three countries evaluated had very low 
conscript rates within their marine forces. 
• Following USMC doctrine indicates whether the country is or is not 
following USMC doctrine. Currently the US Marine Corps is changing 
doctrine to the Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS) concept. 
OMFTS requires a major change in requirements, e.g., LCAC, MV -22, 
and AAAV. To follow this doctrine through the change would require 
each ally to acquire the same or similar systems. Currently all three 
countries evaluated follow USMC doctrine. 
• Steps toward OMFTS (Operational Maneuver from the Sea) indicate 
whether the country has made steps towards the possibility of acquiring 
the LCAC, MV-22, or AAA V. This would reveal the likelihood of 
continuing to follow the USMC doctrine with subsequent purchase of 
AAA V s. Research indicates that Italy and ROK have made steps toward 
the OMFTS concept. Brazil has not. 
• The number of amphibious vehicles provides the basis for considering 
the economies of scale issue in spares support. Italy and Brazil have few 
vehicles where ROK has the second largest inventory in the world (second 
to the US). With similar industrial capabilities, it does not seem 
economically sound for Italy or Brazil to produce spare parts for their 
small number of vehicles. With ROK, the number of vehicles could 
justify the expenditure. 
• Number of RAMIRS AA Vs indicates the desire to have upgraded AA Vs, 
but as noted in Chapter III, RAMIRS AA V s have different spare parts 
requirements than the older versions. Italy is procuring nine vehicles with 
RAMIRS. ROK and Brazil have no RAMIRS AA Vs and do not plan on 
obtaining any in the near future. This indicates the desire to modernize 
above the current capabilities of the AA V7 A 1, which might also indicate 
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the desire not to wait for the AAA V once available to be fielded. The 
RAMIRS vehicles may meet a country's requirements which might be 
above those capabilities of the AA V7 A 1 but not as high as the AAA V. 
• Date of Last AA V Purchase is a factor that provides the country's last 
procurement to fill the amphibious vehicles requirement of the countries 
military. Italy and ROK are currently procuring vehicles and Brazil's last 
purchase was in 1997. Recent buys would suggest that the country is 
postponing any decisions to buy AAA V. 
• Threat Level is a factor that indicates the country's current defense 
posture and their sense of urgency toward maintaining their capability in 
the likelihood of war. Italy and Brazil have no major immediate threats to 
their national security. ROK lives with constant threats to their security, 
particularly from North Korea. 
• Trust is a factor that may be misleading. It is a measure of the country's 
confidence that the US will be there to assist with their military 
requirements. With Italy, it is not an issue (Nil) because of their 
relationships with many other highly developed nations. 
• Need for US Assistance is a factor that describes the level to which the 
country depends on the US for its security. Italy as a member ofNATO 
and the EU has other countries on which they can depend. Brazil has 
close ties with the US and relies on the US for some of its military 
readiness but does not depend on the US in order to maintain its 
sovereignty. ROK has US military forces stationed in their country in 
order to help maintain their sovereignty; without the US, ROK would not 
be a sovereign nation, therefore their need is high. 
• Current Spares Support is a factor that describes the extent to which 
spares support is currently being utilized within the country. This must be 
considered an indicator of whether such support will be requested in the 
future. Italy utilizes indigenous support while ROK and Brazil utilize 
FMS to support their vehicles. 
A. ITALY 
Italy procures its spares indigenously. Having an unemployment rate of 13% in 
the working age population, its government must be concerned about maintaining 
employment as an issue closely related to political stability. The Italian people have 
shown their disfavor for many of their governments in the past. They have also shown 
that there is no fear of voting out the incumbent politician. The Italian democracy is 
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stable, emphasizing that there is little fear of a coup or military takeover. There is also no 
immediate threat to their sovereignty from an outside source. This lack of fear 
encourages the population to be concerned about improving their domestic status. 
Italy has 25 amphibious vehicles and soon will add another nine. Clearly there 
can be no economies of scale with such a small number. As stated in Chapter IV, in 
order to get a funding request for spares support, the funding must pass through Italian 
Parliament. There is also a scarcity of funding for the military. In order to get the spares, 
the requester will need to show the benefits to the country. Even though indigenously 
manufactured spares will cost more, it will employ Italians and appease the Parliament 
members' constituents. Therefore, maintaining employment seems a higher priority than 
saving defense monies. In Italy, the operative factor is not economies of scale, it's 
politics. Italy has had the L VT for nearly 30 years. The majority of those vehicles are 
still in working condition. The cost of factory setup and tooling clearly did not deter the 
Italians from producing the spare parts necessary to maintain their vehicles. In Italy, the 
political cost of buying support is too high to justify a foreign purchase. 
B. KOREA 
The ROK is under a constant threat to the survival of their nation. ROK needs the 
US in order to assure its sovereignty. With 35,000 US service members currently located 
in the ROK due to the high threat level, the ROK is dependent on the US to augment its 
forces. This relationship depends on trust. When the co-production arrangement 
developed between ROK's Samsung and United Defense for the production of RAMIRS 
AA Vs, it was a 50150 split. The contract calls for ROK to manufacture designated parts 
and assemble the vehicles. United Defense would supply other designated parts along 
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with the AA V hull. ROK determined that many of the parts designated for them to 
manufacture would be purchased via FMS from the US instead. With 57 vehicles being 
manufactured and another 67 follow-on to be produced, the total of amphibious vehicles 
will be brought up to 227. One would assume that with a capable industrial base, ROK 
could produce all designated parts themselves. The requirements for follow-on support 
for the life cycle of the vehicle should make up for the tooling and set-up costs through 
economies of scale. Such is not the case. ROK, with their capable industrial base, still 
requests that many of their designated parts and spares support come from the US. The 
reason may be a capacity problem. ROK does not want to waste their capacity on parts 
or spares support for the 227 vehicles. ROK indigenously produces 15% of their spare 
parts for their current 103 amphibious vehicles (not counting the 124 presently being co-
produced). Assuming more than 15% commonality of parts and expected life of the 
vehicles to be in excess of 30 years, it must also be assumed that a higher percentage of 
the parts could be produced indigenously while achieving economies of scale. With a 
growing economy and a relatively low unemployment rate, the ROK does not need to 
force its industrial sector to produce support for AA V s. 
The ROK does not have the political factors that demand that the government 
manufacture everything within the country. A major concern for the ROK is threat to 
national security. The link between threat to national security and ROK's use of FMS 
requires additional discussion. The 227 vehicles that ROK will have in the near future, 
does constitute economies of scale for more than 15% spare support. However, the threat 
plays another role. The US has cultivated the industrial capability of the ROK since the 
end of the Korean War. There is a clear understanding that the ROK and the United 
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States are in this together. ROK knows that the US Government will deliver when 
support is needed, which is very comforting to the ROK. Also, the US benefits through 
economies of scale when the ROK procures via FMS. Thus, the ROK gets the support it 
needs guaranteed, and benefits its closest ally. All this at a lower price for support. An 
additional benefit is that ROK does not need to tie up industrial capacity at reduced 
marginal profits in supporting AA V. 
C. BRAZIL 
Brazil owns 26 amphibious vehicles. As mentioned in Chapter IV, 
MARCORSYSCOM went to Brazil to determine if it was feasible to indigenously 
produce spare parts to maintain their AA V s. The conclusion was that it was not 
economically feasible. Cost of factory setup and tooling would not justify the expense. 
Brazil is a country concerned with improving their industrial base. If something 
can be produced economically, it will be. Their unemployment is fairly low at 7%. The 
government wants stability and growth within their industrial base. However, forcing the 
industrial sector to produce spare parts for 26 vehicles would not create growth. The cost 
associated with such an undertaking would be significant. Since the BRMC is only 3.3% 
of the entire: military, procuring spares support indigenously would break the BRMC 
bank for some time to come. 
Brazil also believed that with their 1997 purchase, United Defense was not 
meeting the requirements of the contract, specifically the warranty. The USMC went to 
Brazil to arbitrate and remedy the problem. The US Marine Corps' oversight ensured 
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that the Brazilian Marine Corps' AA Vs were in working condition and US Marine 
mechanics worked on the vehicles themselves. 
With Brazil, it is clear that they lack economies of scale for AA V. The operative 
issue then becomes the choice of DCS or FMS. With the trust factor, it can be assumed 
that Brazil will continue to pursue FMS in the future, both for procurement and follow-on 
support. In some cases where DCS is less costly, Brazil will still choose to procure via 
FMS. Their decision will be based on trust and who can be trusted more, a corporation or 
a country. With Brazil, at least for now, their answer will be to purchase directly from 
the US through FMS. 
D. SUMMARY 
Based on analysis of Italy, Republic of Korea, and Brazil, the four primary factors 
that influence decision makers on how to procure major end items and/or spares support 
are stability of the government, economies of scale, issues of national security and trust in 
the United States. 
In the case of Italy, which has gone through 57 governments since 1945, political 
survivability is a major factor for government officials. Italian politicians are very 
concerned about angering their constituents through the purchase of international goods 
and services. To do so might result in bringing down the government. The success or 
failure of a government is often based on issues of financial stability. 
For Brazil, it was a clear case of economies of scale not being present. Therefore, 
their decision becomes a choice of FMS or DCS and the researcher has concluded that 
the determining factor is the issue of trust. 
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With ROK the economies of scale would have suggested indigenous support, but 
the other issues of threat to national security, and trust in the US have tipped the scale in 
favor ofFMS. 
In the case of Brazil, once economies of scale issues are no longer issues they will 
consider whether to procure DCS or FMS. The issue of trust becomes the determining 
factor. Brazil trusts the US to deliver on its promises. Brazil knows that the USMC and 
the US Government will always be there for them. The US Government has 
demonstrated that it is a dependable provider that stands behind its FMS sales. With the 
ROK, trust is also the issue. The ROK turns to the US because it knows the US will 
always be of assistance. ROK has direct dealings with United Defense and works closely 
with them in the co-production procurement but will still procure spares via FMS and 
support because of trust. It is a deep-rooted result of the US investing in the sovereignty 
of the ROK. Without the United State's past intervention, the ROK would not exist. In 
the case of Italy, trust in the US is not an issue. Italy is more concerned about domestic 
issues; however, given the option of FMS or DCS, Italians will more likely choose the 
method that costs less. 
Partnerships between Government and industry present a special case that should 
be considered separately. As mentioned in Chapter III, in the Business Partnership 
Agreement (BP A), the US Marine Corps will be a party to the agreement for all DCS 
sales. In this case, the issue of trust no longer seems to be the determinant between FMS 
and DCS. With business partnership arrangements, the US Government is a participant 
either in FMS or DCS and countries that prefer to deal with the US can achieve cost 
reduction benefit of DCS while retaining the confidence in working with the US. 
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For all foreign sales in the future, spares support will be an issue. Spares support 
to international customers needs to be quantified due to their potential impact on the 
affordability of the US acquisition program. Spares support volume is critical in 
determining life-cycle costs for US programs as well as international. It seems that by 
evaluating stability of the government, economies of scale, issues of national security and 
trust in the United States, one might be able to predict the manner in which allies might 
decide on spares support. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The research conducted in this thesis indicates that the purchase of spare parts in 
FMS sales follow according to each country's needs. Political pressure may require a 
country to produce spare parts indigenously. If political pressure is not a major factor, 
then a country considers if economies of scale are present. To have economies of scale, 
there must be enough spares to be produced to justify the expense of retooling and 
preparation necessary for indigenous production. If there is little political pressure to 
produce indigenously and sufficient economies of scale are not present, then the decision 
becomes whether to procure the spares via Foreign Military Sales (FMS) or Direct 
Commercial Sales (DCS). This decision is based on the relationship that has developed 
between the consumer nation and the US (assuming the FMS sale is with the US), and the 
relationship between the consumer and a corporation with whom they will deal in the 
DCS contract. Research suggests that DCS or FMS decisions will be based on the issue 
of trust. 
The emphasis of this thesis has been on the allied support requirements after the 
purchase of the US Marine Corps amphibious vehicle, the AA V7 Al. With the AAA V 
currently in development, allied nations will consider whether they are interested in 
purchase AAA V. Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) is the concept that they 
will have to embrace before they can determine whether the AAA V is needed. It will be 
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difficult for an ally to fight along side the US without similar maneuver capabilities. US 
allies have two options: 
• Change their doctrine to that similar to the OMFTS concept and acquire 
the maneuverability option of the AAA V, MV-22, and the LCAC bring to 
the battle 
• Have the US Military initiate the attack and then have the allies provide 
follow-on support 
Each choice presents a problem: 
• The high costs incurred in changing doctrine, retraining the military to the 
new doctrine, and procuring the needed maneuver assets 
• The allied country must convince the US to attack initially alone, incurring 
the cost of loss of human lives and equipment, which is usually higher in 
initial attack. This may sway public opinion and deter the US from 
participation. Public support for any military action is critical in lieu of 
today's instant media reporting. 
As Sir Isaac Newton said "Every action has an opposite and equal reaction". 
Under the assumption that an allied country chooses option (1) and procures the 
AAA V, then how will it be supported? Considering the primary factors of stability of the 
government and economies of scale, threat to national security and the factor of trust, one 
can come to a conclusion fairly quickly as to whether not the AAA V customer will use 
indigenous production, DCS or FMS to procure their spare support. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
• The predictive model for determining future methods of purchase spare 
parts be utilized for every potential FMS customer 
• The OMFTS concept, which the US Marine Corps has embraced, has to be 
emphasized to all allies' amphibious forces. Embracing the concept will 
encourage AAA V sales, which will be accompanied by upgraded training. 
• The US Government demonstrates to allied nations the higher costs of 
producing spares indigenously where economies of scale are not present. 
Production should be encouraged where most efficient 
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C. AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH 
• An analysis be conducted on Japan, and Taiwan, using the predictive 
model described in this thesis, to determine their potential for acquiring 
spare support via FMS. They are potential AAA V customers 
• A study be conducted using the predictive model (appropriately modified) 
to determine its utility related to FMS and DCS purchases of similar items 
• An examination be conducted involving the same countries evaluated in 
this thesis five to ten years from now to determine the changes in the 
factors evaluated in Chapter IV 
• A study be conducted to examine where a contractor and the US 
Government are involved in a partnership agreement and how the issue of 
trust may have changed for the customer 
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